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This paper develops a model of political contributions in which a politician can either sell
policy favors, or sell access. Access allows interest groups to share hard information with the
politician in support of their preferred policy. Here selling access maximizes policy utility, while
selling policy favors maximizes total contributions. Imposing a binding contribution limit makes
it more likely that the politician sells access, which can improve expected constituent welfare.
However, a contribution limit distorts the signals associated with the contributions, which tends
to result in worse policy. Alternatively, a tax on political contributions can ensure that the
politician sells access without distorting his information. Therefore, from the viewpoint of a
representative constituent, a tax on contributions is strictly preferred to a contribution limit or
no reform. The politician, however, may prefer regulation in the form of a contribution limit,
even when a tax is better for the constituent. (JEL D72, D44, D82, D78)
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11 Introduction
How might political contributions inﬂuence the decisions of politicians? The economics and political
science literature highlight two means of inﬂuence. First, money may be contributed in a quid pro
quo exchange for a policy favor or favorable vote on an issue. Second, money may be contributed to
help secure access to a politician, where access allows one to inﬂuence policy through the provision
of evidence in favor of one policy, or against another.1 The theoretical literature includes both
models in which politicians sell favors (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994, Baye et al. 1993, Tullock
1980) and models in which politicians sell access (e.g., Austen-Smith 1998). This paper allows for
both of these possibilities, developing a game theoretic model in which a politician chooses whether
to sell favors or to sell access. It then uses the framework to assess two di erent campaign ﬁnance
reforms, including taxing contributions and imposing contribution limits.
This is the ﬁrst paper in which a politician chooses between selling policy favors and selling
access.2 If the politician sells favors, he does so using an all-pay auction, rent-seeking mechanism
as is common in the lobbying literature (e.g., Gavious et al. 2002, Che and Gale 1998, Baye et al.
1993). Interest groups simultaneously submit contributions to the politician, then the politician
votes in favor of the highest contributor. Alternatively, the politician may sell access through a
similar process in which groups submit contributions and the high contributor wins access. An
interest group with access can present hard evidence to the politician in support of its preferred
policy. A politician who learns all evidence can identify and implement his fully-informed policy,
which maximizes constituent welfare.
The contributions-for-access model developed here is a tractable framework that is relatively
straightforward to incorporate into a similar model of policy favors. Interest groups provide con-
tributions in competition for access, just as they provide contributions in competition for favors in
1Interest groups and individuals may also provide contributions to help certain politicians compete for and win
(re)election (e.g., Coate 2004b). There is evidence that some interest groups provide political contributions to
inﬂuence elections, while other groups provide contributions in an e ort to inﬂuence the votes of sitting legislators
(e.g., Herndon 1982, Snyder 1992, Stratmann 2005). How money a ects the votes of sitting legislators is open to
debate, as the empirical evidence supports both contribution-for-policy favors and contributions-for-access stories. In
both cases, higher contributions are correlated with favorable votes; and there is little data available to distinguish
between the two stories. By making the choice between selling access and selling favors endogenous, this paper
determines when the politician prefers to engage in either activity.
2Bennedsen and Feldmann (2006) and Dahm and Porteiro (Forthcoming) allow interest groups to inﬂuence policy
through both the disclosure of hard evidence and the quid pro quo exchange of contributions for policy favors. In
these previous models, however, the politician does not control which groups can disclose information, and he is
unable to provide access based on contributions.
2more traditional lobbying games, including the one used to model the allocation of policy favors in
this paper.3 In the equilibrium of the competition for access game, an interest group with stronger
evidence in support of its preferred policy is willing to contribute more in an e ort to win access
than is an otherwise similar group with weaker evidence. When the politician sells access, he learns
about interest group evidence through the revelations of groups with access, and through the sig-
naling power of interest group contributions. In equilibrium, selling access allows the politician to
become fully informed about the evidence of both interest groups even when he only gives access
to one of the groups.
When the politician sells access, contributions allow him to become more informed about the
issue, and to choose better policy than he otherwise could. In addition to caring about policy,
however, the politician also cares about collecting political contributions. Although selling access
results in the politician collecting some contributions, he expects higher total contributions when
he sells policy favors instead of access.4 Therefore, his choice of whether to sell favors or sell access
depends on the issue. For important-enough issues—those for which the politician has the most to
gain from choosing the best policy—the politician sells access. For less-important issues he sells
favors, sacriﬁcing policy utility and constituent welfare in order to collect larger contributions.
A contribution limit (i.e., bid cap) can reduce expected total contributions both when the politi-
cian sells policy and when he sells access. The limit tends to have a larger impact on contributions
in the policy favor game, making selling policy favors relatively less attractive compared with selling
access. A contribution limit can result in the politician selling policy favors for a smaller range of
issue. The downside of a limit, however, is that it distorts the signaling power of the contributions
when the politician does sell access. This means that, conditional on the politician selling access,
he tends to be less informed and chooses worse policy when there is a contribution limit compared
to when there is no limit. Although I show that there exists a binding contribution limit that
improves expected constituent welfare, this is not necessarily true of all limits. It is never optimal
to ban contributions.
Alternatively, society may tax political contributions. Similar to a limit, a tax reduces the
3See for example the models by Che and Gale (1998), Gavious et al. (2002), Holt (1979), Holt and Sherman (1982),
Baye et al. (1993, 1996), Anderson et al. (1998).
4When the politician sells access, he maximizes his expected policy utility, but not total contributions. When
the politician sells policy favors, he maximizes expected total contributions, but not policy utility and constituent
welfare.
3politician’s expected revenue both when he sells policy and when he sells access. The impact of
the tax is greater in the policy favor game, and it therefore makes selling policy relatively less
attractive compared with selling access. A tax decreases the range of issues for which the politician
sells policy favors. Unlike a limit, however, a tax does not distort the interest groups’ willingness
to contribute in competition for either policy favors or access. Therefore, the tax does not distort
the signaling power of the contributions in the access game. When the politician sells access, he is
able to identify and implement the fully-informed policy even under a high tax rate.
Unlike a limit, a tax unambiguously improves expected constituent welfare. Furthermore, one
can always set a tax such that expected constituent welfare is higher than under any limit or no
regulation. Here, taxes are strictly better than limits at regulating contributions. Although a tax
is better for constituent welfare than a limit, however, the politician may prefer for contributions
to be regulated by a limit, as a limit may have less of an impact on total contributions.
The primary contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it develops the ﬁrst model of
political contributions in which a politician chooses whether to sell favors or sell access. By giving
the politician this choice, the model should provide a better understanding of the interaction
between interest groups and politicians, and the inﬂuence that political contributions may have
on the decision making process. In this paper, the means by which the politician may sell favors
is relatively standard for the literature, building on the work of Gavious et al. (2002) and others.
The means by which the politician may sell access, however, is relatively novel and represents its
own contribution to the lobbying literature. To my knowledge the competition for access model
developed here and Austen-Smith (1998) represent the only two theoretical frameworks in which
buying access allows an agent (or interest group) to share veriﬁable evidence with a decision maker.5
The primary di erence between the access model in the present paper and Austen-Smith (1998) is
the mechanism through which the politician allocates access: In this paper the politician awards
access to the highest contributor; in Austen-Smith (1998) the politician announces prices for access
and any interest group that pays the announced price gains access.6 For the purpose of this paper,
5Cotton (2008) incorporates the evidentiary structure developed in this paper into a model of price setting similar
to Austen-Smith (1998). Most other papers that incorporate “access” either do not consider veriﬁable or hard
information, or they do not give the politician control over which groups can disclose evidence. For example, Austen-
Smith (1995), Ball (1995), and Lohmann (1995) develop models in which interest groups receive private, unveriﬁable
signals about the impact of a certain policy.
6How politicians actually do award access is open to debate. Although there is substantial data on political
contributions in the U.S., there is little data available how politicians spend their time and with whom they meet.
4the competition for access framework o ers the distinct advantage of it being straightforward to
incorporate with a standard model of policy favors. Section 8 discusses why the main results of the
paper should continue to hold if the politician sells access through a pricing game rather than an
auction.
The second primary contribution of this paper is the consideration of contribution limits and
taxes. The paper shows that both limits and taxes can cause the politician to switch from selling
favors to selling access.7 A tax, however, is strictly preferred to a limit since it can cause the
politician to sell access without distorting the signals associated with the contributions and the
politician’s information.8 This result is in contrast to Drazen et al. (2007) which also allows for both
a contribution limit and tax. Drazen et al. (2007) considers interest group formation in a variation
of the money-for-policy-favor game, and shows that a contribution tax can o set the negative
impact of the contribution limit; suggesting that a limit and tax should be used in combination.9
In the current paper, in which the politician may also sell access and there is no concern about
interest group formation, a tax is strictly preferable to a contribution limit, and there is no beneﬁt
to using them in combination. Other papers focus on contribution limits alone.10 Austen-Smith
(1998) shows how a limit may result in a more informed politician in an access game where interest
groups di er in terms of their evidence reliability. In such a model, a limit can cause the politician
to provide access to more-informed interest groups rather than groups with higher willingness to
pay for access. This is not the case in the present paper, as there is no reliability issues with
the evidentiary structure. Instead, the present paper focuses on di erences in issue importance.
Incorporating reliability issues will likely weaken, but not eliminate this paper’s results.
See Stratmann (2005) for an overview of the empirical literature concerning money in politics.
7Such an e ect is similar to the impact of contribution limits in the policy favor games by Prat (2002a,b) and
Coate (2004a), where limits decrease the monetary incentives to provide policy favors and increase the likelihood
that a politician chooses the policies preferred by his constituents rather than the policies preferred by an interest
group. In these other papers, however, the identity of the ideal policy is known ex ante; there is no role for access,
and contributions do not help the political learn about the best policy.
8In Wittman (2002) and Coate (2004b), limits decrease the amount of advertising, which results in a less-informed
electorate. In a game with access, a limit may also result in a less-informed politician.
9In Drazen et al. (2007) politicians and lobbyists bargain over a policy choice. There, a binding contribution limit
can increase the bargaining power of lobbyists, increasing the expected returns from lobbying. When this is the case,
a limit can result in the formation of more lobbying groups, and therefore worse policy from the perspective of the
politician’s constituents. A contribution tax can o set the negative impact of the contribution limit.
10For example, Dahm and Porteiro (Forthcoming) show how contribution limits may deter informational lobbying
in a game in which interest groups have free access to a politician. In Riezman and Wilson (1997), a politician may
choose to sell additional policy favors in order to make up for a decrease in contributions that result from a limit.
Both Che and Gale (1998) and Gavious et al. (2002) consider the e ects of contribution limits on total revenue.
5The model is described in Section 2 and solved in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 consider the
impact on equilibrium behavior and policy outcomes of a contribution limit and a tax, respectively.
The welfare e ect of a limit and a tax are compared in Section 6. Section 7 incorporates interest
group asymmetries into the model. Allowing for wealth or valuation di erences does not change the
results. Section 8 discusses alternative assumptions about the underlying mechanisms for awarding
policy and access. It also discusses the cases of noisy interest group evidence, and costly evidence
production. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Model
A politician must choose a policy from a continuous, single-dimensional policy space [ 1,1]. Denote
his choice of policy by p. There are two interest groups associated with the issue; group L strictly
prefers lower (leftward) p and group R prefers higher (rightward) p all else equal. The politician
experiences policy utility W(p) from his policy choice, where
W(p)=
 





The analysis assumes that the politician’s policy utility is equivalent to the welfare function for his
representative constituent (a non player in the game). The politician is ex ante uncertain about
the values  R and  L which represent the beneﬁts and costs of marginal changes in policy. The
value  
p2
2 incorporates into W(p) a tendency for the representative constituent to prefer moderate
policy. The value  > 0 represents issue important, and is the realization of a random variable
continuously distributed on R++ according to distribution G and density g.
Let ˆ p denote the policy the politician prefers when he is fully informed. Therefore, ˆ p  
argmaxp W(p)= R    L. If the politician chooses p =ˆ p, he maximizes both his own policy
utility and the welfare of the representative constituent.11
11The speciﬁed equation for W simpliﬁes the analysis. Alternative functions may also be used. For example,
one may incorporate bias into the policy utility function by setting W(p)=
h





where ˆ p then equals  R    L + Bias. Such Bias represents the political leanings of the politician or his con-
stituent. In another example, the politician may be responsible for choosing a trade tari  p   (0,1), for which
W(p) = [ R lnp +  L ln(1   p)] , and where ˆ p equals
 R
 R+ L. For the full-information result to hold, without other
modiﬁcations to the model, W must be such that  ˆ p/  R =   ˆ p/  L. However, as long as  ˆ p/  R > 0 and
 ˆ p/  L < 0, the politician can still become fully informed by selling access, so long as he grants access to the group
that signals the highest  . See for example the discussion concerning interest group asymmetries in section 7.
6Each interest group j  {L,R} observes its own  j, but not that of the other group. Each
group’s  j is the independent realization of a random variable uniformly distributed on [0.1].12 The
distribution of   is common knowledge. Each interest group has private, veriﬁable evidence about
its own  j. Formally, the evidentiary structure meets the requirements of Lipman and Seppi (1995)’s
full reports condition and Bull and Watson (2007)’s evidentiary normality condition, which require
that higher-type agents (i.e., agents with higher  j) can always provide evidence not available
to lower-type agents. An agent can underrepresent but not exaggerate its evidence. If group
j  {L,R} has access to the politician, it can costlessly present any evidence amount ej   [0, j],
or he can refuse to present any evidence setting ej =  .13
The politician controls which interest groups receives access. Due to time constraints, I assume
the politician can only grant access to one of the groups; however, this assumption may be relaxed.14
If he grants a group access, that group is able to present evidence ej.
Let cj   0 denote the political contribution that group j pays the politician.
Payo s–The politician prefers to set policy as close to the fully-informed policy as possible.
He also beneﬁts from collecting political contributions. His payo  is given
UP = W(p)+cL + cR.
Interest groups prefer more extreme policies, and they ﬁnd providing political contributions
costly. Given implemented policy p, groups L and R earn respective payo 
UL =  pv
2   cL, and
UR = pv
2   cR.
The value v
2 > 0 represents how much interest groups care about policy relative to money. For
now, interest groups di er in terms of their evidence, and not in terms of their valuation. They
12Assuming that draws of   are uniformly distributed and uncorrelated simpliﬁes the analysis, but is not necessary.
The  ’s may be (negatively) correlated and drawn from less-straightforward distributions.
13One may think of an interest group’s evidence as a collection of veriﬁable documents. For a detailed discussion,
see Bull and Watson (2004, 2007).
14The time constraint is reasonable if one thinks of the game being repeated across many issues and many di erent
interest groups. Alternatively, the politician could ﬁnd granting access costly, in which case he prefers to give access
to one group rather than both groups. So long as the cost of access is small enough, the results of the analysis
continue to hold: tax is better for constituent welfare than a limit, or no regulation.
7share a common v. Section 7 allows for group asymmetries.
Game Order–The politician can sell access or a policy favor. If he sells access, the group
that receives access can present evidence to the politician. If he sells a policy favor, the group that
receives the favor gets to choose the policy that is implemented.
The game takes place as follows:
1. The politician chooses whether to sell access or a policy favor at the beginning of the game.
Denote this choice by a, where a = 1 if the politician sells access and a = 0 if he sells a policy
favor.
2. Whether the politician sells access or a policy favor, interest groups compete for the “prize”
in the same way. Both interest groups simultaneously contribute to the politician, and the
group that provides the highest contribution wins the prize.
3. If the politician sells a policy favor, then the winner of the prize competition chooses a policy.
If the politician sells access, then the winner of the prize competition chooses evidence to
reveal to the politician; then, after updating his beliefs about the evidence quality of both
interest groups, the politician chooses a policy.
Let w  {L,R} denote the identity of the prize winner.
Player Strategies and Equilibrium Concept–In both the access and policy-favor subgames,
interest groups must choose how much to contribute to the politician. In the access subgame,
groups must also choose the evidence ej   [0, j] or   to reveal. A complete description of an
interest group’s strategy must describe its choice of cj and ej for each possible ( , j,a) triple.
The politician must choose whether to sell access or policy, and if he sells access he must also
choose a policy at the end of the game. A complete description of his strategy must give his choice
of a for each possible  , as well as his choice of p for each possible ( ,cL,c R,e w) vector.
Let µ represent the politician’s beliefs about the state of the world at the time he chooses policy
in the access subgame. Eµ denotes expectations given beliefs µ, and E (without the subscript)
denotes ex ante expectations before the start of the game.
The analysis solves for the symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game, which I label
the contribution equilibrium. A complete description of the equilibrium must include the strategy
8proﬁles for the interest groups and the politician, as well as the politician’s beliefs about the state
of the world at the time he chooses policy in the access subgame. The politician’s beliefs must
be consistent with Bayes’ Rule on the ex ante distribution of   given the strategies of the interest
groups. Each player’s strategy must be a best response to the strategies of the other players, given
the player’s beliefs.
3 Contribution Equilibrium
The paper ﬁrst determines interest group behavior and policy choice in the access and policy-favor
subgames, then it considers the politician’s choice of whether to sell access or sell policy.
3.1 Selling Policy Favors
When the politician chooses to sell a policy favor, the interest groups compete in a traditional
all-pay auction, rent-seeking game (e.g., Gavious et al. 2002). The interest group that wins the
contest will choose to implement the most extreme p in its preferred direction. Group L prefers
to implement policy pL    1, and group R prefers prefers policy pR   1. The winning group
earns policy payo  of v
2, and the other group receives policy payo  equal to  v
2. Therefore, holding
contributions constant, an interest group values winning the contest at v.
If group w wins, it sets p = pw. The winning group earns payo  Uw = v
2  cw. The non-winning
group (denoted  w) earns payo  U w =  v
2   c w. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in the
all-pay auction game with complete information about player valuations. The mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of the policy favor subgame involves each interest group contributing c according to
distribution H, where H(c)=c
v. Since both interest groups share a common valuation for the
prize, no one is willing to bid (on average) more than the other group in an e ort to secure the
prize. In equilibrium, the politician is equally likely to award the policy favor to interest group R
as he is to award the favor to interest group L.
Expected total contributions from selling the policy favor equal v. The politician is able to
extract all of the expected rent from the interest groups. The resulting policy choice, however, is
at the extreme end of the policy space. The politician’s expected policy utility from selling a favor
for issue   equals E(W|a = 0) =  
 




Policy Choice–When the politician sells access, he retains the right to choose policy. Since
the policy decision is made at the end of the game, it cannot a ect contributions. Therefore,
the politician chooses p to maximize EµW(p). He sets p equal to his expectation regarding ˆ p or
p = Eµ R   Eµ L. Only when the politician is fully informed about  L and  R is he able to
identify and implement the fully-informed policy ˆ p.
Evidence Revelation–Any interest group with access reveals all of its evidence, ej =  j.
This is a standard result in the hard evidence literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Bull and
Watson 2004). If a group with access revealed ej < j, then the group could costlessly represent
higher   by revealing ej =  j instead. Only when each type of agent reveals ej =  j do no groups
have an incentive to deviate. Similarly, no agent with  j > 0 will ever refuse to reveal evidence. If
ej =  , the principal updates his beliefs putting probability 1 on  j = 0.15
In equilibrium, any group j with access reveals ej =  j. Therefore, when group j reveals
evidence ei to the politician, the politician’s beliefs µ must put probability 1 on  j = ej and
probability 0 on any state in which  j  = ej. This means that if the politician gives access to group
j, then he fully learns its type and Eµ j =  j.
Interest Group Contributions–In equilibrium, all interest groups contribute according to
the contribution function C. It is straightforward to show that C is strictly increasing in  j.16
Since C is strictly increasing, it is invertible, where   (c)=C 1( ), and there exists a one-to-one
mapping between a group’s contribution and its evidence quality. It immediately follows that a
rational agent can determine an interest group’s   if he observes its contribution.
To solve for the equilibrium contribution function, the analysis solves for the contribution deci-
sion of interest group j assuming that interest group  j contributes according the the equilibrium
function. Because group  j contributes according to C, the politician can correctly infer   j from
15If instead the politician’s beliefs are such that Eµ j > 0 when ej =  , then all groups with  j   Eµ j (and no
groups with  j >E µ j) have an incentive to announce ej =  . The politician recognizes this and his beliefs therefore
must account for the types of agents that do announce ej =  , which requires him to lower Eµ j. Again however,
only groups with actual qualiﬁcations lower than the updated expected qualiﬁcations have an incentive to refuse to
reveal their evidence. The reasoning repeats, and the required Eµ( j | ej =  )   0; only then do no groups have an
incentive to deviate. See Milgrom and Roberts (1986) for a formal proof.
16To show this, solve for the equilibrium under the assumptions that C is strictly decreasing in  , or that C is
not strictly monotonic. Either alternative assumption results in a contradiction when solving for the equilibrium
contribution function.
10c j. Interest group j chooses contribution cj to maximize its expected utility
v
2
    (cj)
0





[  (cj)     j]d  j   cj. (1)
Interest group j wins access so long as c j <c j, which happens whenever C(  j) <c j or   j <
  (cj). The ﬁrst integral in the expression represents the group’s payo  when it wins access, in
which case the group reveals its evidence and  j to the politician and the politician chooses p =  j 
  j. Even though the politician does not give group  j access, his expectations regarding   j are
correct because group  j contributes according to the strictly increasing equilibrium contribution
function. The second integral in the expression represents the group’s payo  when it does not win
access, and the politician relies on its contribution when updating his expectations regarding  j.
In which case, the politician chooses p =   (c)     j.
The ﬁrst order conditions of the interest group’s expected utility maximization problem are
v
2





   (cj)
 cj
d  j   1 = 0.
In equilibrium,   (cj)= j, and strict monotonicity implies that [   (cj)/ cj]
 1 = C ( j). There-
fore, the ﬁrst order conditions simplify to




It is straightforward to show that the initial requirement that C ( j) > 0 holds. Integrating with
respect to  j gives the equilibrium contribution function17







Information Revelation and the Role of Access–Because the contribution function is
strictly increasing in  j, there exists a one-to-one mapping between each group’s contribution and
its evidence quality. A group with the highest-possible   contributes C(1) = v
4, and a group with
17The interest group’s expected payo  is strictly increasing in cj up to cj = C( j), and strictly decreasing in cj
for all higher values. If the group provides no contribution, the politician expects that the group has  j =  (0) = 0.
Thus, interest groups do not prefer to provide any other contribution than C( j). Any o -equilibrium contribution
cj >C (1) is interpreted by the politician as representing some feasible     [0,1] (rather than some larger  > 1).
11Figure 1: Example contribution function
the lowest-possible   contributes C(0) = 0. For all values     [0,1], a higher   means a larger
contribution. The politician recognizes this and in equilibrium he correctly infers the evidence
quality of both interest groups, even though he only gives access to one of them. In equilibrium,
Eµ j =  j for both interest groups, and the politician chooses p =ˆ p.
If interest group j contributes more than C( j), then the politician will overestimate  j when
the group does not receive access. In order for no interest group to have an incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium contribution function, the expected policy beneﬁt from marginally increasing
one’s contribution in order to signal higher evidence must be completely o set by the monetary
costs of submitting a higher contribution. This is the condition given by Eq. 2. Figure 1 shows
an example contribution function. At low  , an interest group is relatively unlikely to win access;
therefore the beneﬁt of marginally increasing its contribution is relatively large. Over such values of
  the slope of the contribution function must be relatively steep to o set the incentive to increase
one’s contribution. Alternatively, an interest group with a high   is relatively likely to submit the
high contribution and win access. Therefore, the politician is likely to learn its true   even if it
over contributes in order to signal higher evidence. Over such   the beneﬁt of signaling a higher  
is relatively small; therefore, the slope of the contribution function does not need to be as steep to
o set these beneﬁts.
In equilibrium, the politician becomes fully informed about the evidence quality of both groups
12by observing their contributions alone. This does not imply that the politician becomes fully
informed even when he provides no access. If the politician does not provide access to either group,
then the contributions become uninformative.18
Politician Payo s–In equilibrium, the politician set p =ˆ p, maximizing his policy payo  and
constituent welfare at W(ˆ p)=
( R  L)2
2  . The politician’s ex ante expected policy utility when




0 W(ˆ p)d Ld R =
 
12. Total ex ante expected contributions
equal E(cL + cR|a = 1) = 2
  1
0 C( )d  = v
3. The politician’s expected utility when he sells access




3.3 Selling Policy v. Selling Access
By selling policy the politician maximizes his expected total contributions, but does so at the cost of
implementing a less-than-ideal policy. By selling access, the politician maximizes his policy utility,
but collects lower contributions.
Lemma 1 In the contribution equilibrium
• selling policy favors results in the highest possible expected contribution revenue, but does not
maximize policy utility;
• selling access results in the highest possible policy utility, but does not maximize expected
contribution revenue.
It is straightforward to determine when he prefers each course of action.19 The politician prefers
to sell access when E(UP|a = 1)   E(UP|a = 0), or
 
12 + v
3   
 
2 +v. This result is restated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the contribution equilibrium:
1. For important-enough issues (i.e.,     8
7v), the politician sells access and p =ˆ p.
18Without access, all interest groups face the same incentives when choosing their contributions; a group with a
high   is no longer willing to provide a larger contribution than a group with a lower  . The politician recognizes this
and does not take the size of the contributions into account when updating his beliefs. This means that Eµ j = E j
for both j  {L,R}, and the access selling politician chooses p = 0.
19I assume that the indi erent politician sells access.
132. For less-important issues (i.e.,  < 8
7v), the politician sells policy favors and p  =ˆ p with
probability 1.
The variable   represents how much the politician cares about policy relative to how much he
cares about political contributions. This means that the politician prefers to sell access rather than
policy favors if the issue is important enough–if he cares enough about the policy outcome relative
to contributions. For less important issues, he chooses to sell policy favors which results in higher
revenue and lower policy utility.
Throughout the paper, ¯   denotes the cuto  value at which the politician is indi erent between
selling access and selling policy favors. Let ¯  ( )=8
7v denote this value for the case without
campaign ﬁnance reform (i.e., no contribution limit or tax). The following sections derive the
cuto  values when there is a limit and a tax, ¯  (¯ c) and ¯  ( ) respectively.
4 Contribution Limit
This section considers the impact of a contribution limit on equilibrium behavior and policy out-
comes. An interest group cannot contribute more than the limit, denoted ¯ c   [0,v). If ¯ c = 0, there
is a contribution ban. The limit is assumed less than v since without the limit no interest group
will every contribute more than v.
4.1 Policy Favor Game with Limit
Equilibrium contributions depend on the size of the limit. For the case when ¯ c   v
2, each interest
group contributes ¯ c, and each wins the prize with equal probability. Total revenue equals 2¯ c which
is strictly less than the no-limit expected revenue of v.
For the case when ¯ c>v
2, groups contribute according to a mixed strategy. Their contributions
are made according to distribution H¯ c, where
H¯ c(c)=
 
         
         
c
v for c   (0,2¯ c   v]
2¯ c v
v for c   (2¯ c   v,¯ c)
1 for c =¯ c.
14Each group wins the prize with equal probability, and has an expected contribution of v
2. Just as
in the case without a contribution limit, a high enough limit (i.e., ¯ c>v
2) results in the interest
groups competing away all of their expected rent. The politician continues to collect v in expected
contributions.
Only a strict enough contribution limit a ects politician utility in the policy favor subgame. To
impact the politician’s expected payo s from selling policy, it must be that ¯ c<v
2. Otherwise, the
politician’s expected payo  from selling policy is unchanged.20 Independent of ¯ c, the politician’s
expected policy utility equals  
 
2 whenever he sells policy favors.
4.2 Access Game with Limit
Under a limit, the politician will still choose the policy he expects maximizes W(p) given his beliefs;
although the limit might inﬂuence the policy choice be inﬂuencing the politician’s information and
his beliefs about ˆ p. Furthermore, regardless of the limit, an interest group with access will always
fully reveal its evidence. The limit can a ect the interest groups’ equilibrium contribution strategy.
Without a limit, the maximum interest group contribution in the access game is v
4. Therefore,
any ¯ c   v
4 has no impact on behavior in the access game. For ¯ c<v
4, interest groups contribute
according to function C¯ c, where
C¯ c( )=
 
   
   
 
1    
2
   v
2 for  < ¯  (¯ c)
¯ c for     ¯  (¯ c)
(4)
where









Appendix section 10.1 provides details about the derivation of C¯ c. Figure 2 provides an example
contribution function. An interest group with   equal to the cuto  value ¯  (¯ c) is indi erent between
contributing according the the increasing contribution function and contributing the maximum
amount ¯ c. The cuto  value ¯   takes on values between 0 and 1 as ¯ c increases from v
8 to v
4. If ¯ c   v
8,
20Che and Gale (1998) assume that interest groups di er in terms of their valuations. In that case, they show that
a limit can actually increase expected total contributions. Allowing for such di erences in this paper would mean
an ever stricter contribution limit is required in order to decrease the politician’s expected utility from selling policy
favors.
15Figure 2: Example contribution function with limit ¯ c
then ¯   = 0 and all interest groups contribute the limit independent of their evidence quality.
Any contribution limit ¯ c<v
4 results in a pooling equilibrium in which any interest group
with  j   [¯  (¯ c),1] contributes ¯ c. A politician who observes cj =¯ c can no longer infer  j from
observing the contribution alone. Without granting the group access, the politician only learns that
 j   [¯  (¯ c),1]. The potential for pooling results in a less-than-fully informed politician whenever
both interest groups contribute ¯ c; in which case the politician randomly awards access to one of the
groups and remains less than fully informed about the other group’s evidence. If neither or only
one of the groups contributes ¯ c, the politician remains fully informed as he gives access to the high
contributor and can fully infer the low contributor’s evidence from its contribution.
With probability (1   ¯  (¯ c))2 both groups contribute ¯ c in which case he remains less than fully
informed about one group’s  . When he chooses policy, he relies on his expectation of  , where
E( |    [¯  ,1]) = ¯  +1
2 . The politician’s ex ante expected utility equals
E(UP|¯ c,a = 1) =
   
12









¯  (¯ c)2
2
 




The term in the ﬁrst set of brackets denotes the politician’s expected policy utility E(W|¯ c,a = 1),
where  (1 ¯  (¯ c))4  
24 is the loss in expected utility from potentially being less informed compared to
the case without a limit. The term in the second set of brackets denotes the expected contribution
16from each group. It is straightforward to show that both expected policy utility and expected
revenue are lower in the access game under a limit than when there is no limit (or when ¯ c   v
4
which means the limit is not binding). For any ¯ c<v
4 expected contribution revenue is strictly
increasing in ¯ c; the stricter the limit, the lower the revenue. Similarly policy utility is strictly





. For any ¯ c>v
4, the limit does not change the access game, and for
any ¯ c<v
8 both groups always contribute the limit and further decreasing ¯ c has no impact on policy
utility.
4.3 Selling Access v. Selling Policy with Limit
As in the case without a contribution limit, the politician sells access whenever his expected utility
in the access subgame is at least as large as his expected utility in the policy favor subgame. It is
straightforward to calculate ¯  (¯ c), the issue importance for which the politician is indi erent between
selling access and selling policy in equilibrium. The cuto  value depends on the contribution limit.
For ¯ c   v
2, the limit does not a ect politician payo s in either the policy favor game or the
access game. Therefore, such a limit cannot a ect the politician’s choice of whether to sell access
or sell policy favors, and the cuto  value equals ¯  ( ).





, the limit a ects expected payo s in the policy favor subgame, but not in the
access subgame. In this case, the politician chooses to sell access if
 
12 + v
3   2¯ c  
 
2. Rearranging
this gives the condition that the politician sells access if     24
7 ¯ c   4
7v, otherwise he sells policy.





, the limit impacts expected payo s in both the policy favor and access subgames.
In this case, the politician sells access if his expected payo  from doing so (given by Eq. 6) is
at least as great as his expected utility from selling favors (i.e., 2¯ c  
 
2). He therefore sells access
whenever    
 
2v¯  (¯ c)
 
3   ¯  (¯ c)2  
/
 
13 + 4¯  (¯ c)   6¯  (¯ c)2 + 4¯  (¯ c)3   ¯  (¯ c)4 
, where ¯  (¯ c) is given by
Eq. 5.





, both interest groups always contribute the limit in both the access and policy
favor games, independent of their evidence qualities. Therefore, both games result in the same
revenue (i.e., 2¯ c) for the politician. The access game, however, results in strictly higher expected
policy utility, as the politician learns one of the group’s evidence before selecting policy. He therefore
strictly prefers to sell access rather than sell policy under such a limit for all  > 0.
17In summary,
¯  (¯ c)=
 
               
               
8
7v for ¯ c   v
2
24
7 ¯ c   4
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For any ¯ c<v
2, the politician sells access for a larger range of   than he does without a limit.
However, any limit ¯ c<v
4 inﬂuences contributions in the access subgame, limiting the amount of
information that the politician can infer from each group’s contribution.
Lemma 2
1. For any ¯ c<v
2, ¯  (¯ c) < ¯  ( ). The limit results in the politician selling access for a larger range
of issues, and selling policy for a smaller range of issues.
2. For any ¯ c<v
4, the limit decreases the probability the politician is fully informed about both
 R and  L when he sells access.
4.4 E ect of Limit on Constituent Welfare
A contribution limit causes the politician to sell access (rather than policy favors) for a larger range
of  . This e ect tends to improve constituent welfare, as the politician more often chooses the policy
he believes is best, rather than choosing an interest group preferred policy.21 When the politician
does sell access, however, a limit also decreases the politician’s ability to learn about evidence by
observing contributions. This e ect decreases expected constituent welfare, as the politician tends
to have less accurate beliefs about ˆ p and is less likely to choose the welfare maximizing policy in
the access game.22
The optimal limit, from the standpoint of constituent welfare, depends on the distribution of
 . Even without additional assumptions regarding the distribution of  , it follows that the optimal
limit (1) will result in a pooling equilibrium in the access game, which tends to decrease the accuracy
21Selling policy always results in lower expected constituent welfare than selling access. This is because selling
policy results in an outcome that is independent of the fully-informed policy ˆ p. If the politician retains the right to
choose policy–as when he sells access–then he chooses the policy he believes is best. Even when he is less-than fully
informed about the evidence, his policy choice tends to be closer to the ideal policy than when an interest group
chooses policy.
22This negative a ect is only true of a limit that is strict enough to inﬂuence behavior in the access game (i.e.,
¯ c < v/4).
18of the politician’s beliefs about ˆ p, and (2) will always be positive. Banning contributions is never
optimal.
Let EW(¯ c) denote ex ante expected constituent welfare under limit ¯ c, and let EW( ) denote
expected welfare when contributions are not limited.






1. EW(¯ c )   EW(¯ c) for all ¯ c   0, and
2. EW(¯ c ) > EW( ).
Let binding limit refer to any limit below the maximum equilibrium contribution in the access
game; therefore, a binding limit is any ¯ c<v
4. Proposition 2 shows that there exists a binding limit
that results in higher expected constituent welfare compared to no limit or any other limit, and that
banning contributions is never optimal. In fact, it is never optimal to impose a limit resulting in
all interest groups contributing ¯ c independent of their type. To see why a limit of v
4 is not optimal,
consider implementing a marginally lower limit. This decrease in the limit causes the politician to
sell access for more issues–a good thing. It also decreases politician information when he does sell
access, but only by a very small amount.23 Similar reasoning rules out a limit of v
8 or below.
5 Taxing Contributions
This section considers the impact of a contribution tax. I show that a proportional tax can have
similar beneﬁts as a contribution limit, but without the information loss.
Consider a tax rate     [0,1]. Any political contribution c is taxed at rate   such that the
politician receives payment (1    )c. The remainder of the tax may go towards some public good
which I do not model.24 I assume that neither the politician nor his constituents beneﬁt from the
tax revenue. If the constituents beneﬁted from the tax, then taxing contributions would be even
more attractive.
23A limit just below
v
4 means a small positive probability that both groups contribute ¯ c, and since the politician
can only give access to one group he remains less than fully about the other group’s evidence. However, because this
other group contributed the limit, the politician correctly infers that the group had high enough evidence quality to
make such a contribution. In this case, the range of   for which an interest group is willing to contribute the limit
is very small; therefore, the politician remains almost-fully informed about the group’s evidence.
24One possibility is that the taxes fund the bureaucratic system necessary to enforce and collect the taxes.
19Unlike a limit, a tax does not distort the interest groups’ incentives to contribute whether they
are competing for access or policy favors. It does, however, inﬂuence the politician’s incentives to
sell policy rather than access.
5.1 Policy Favor Game with Tax
A tax does not change interest group behavior in the policy favor game, and equilibrium contribution
strategies are identical to those in the original game without a tax or a limit. The equilibrium is in
mixed strategies, with each interest group randomly drawing a bid from a uniform (0,v] distribution.
Each group wins with an equal ex ante probability, and Ecj = v
2 for both j. Total expected after-
tax revenue for the politician is (1    )v. Expected politician utility from selling a policy favor is
E(UP| ,a = 0) =  
 
2 + (1    )v.
5.2 Access Game with Tax
Interest groups have the same incentives to contribute as in the original game, and the equilibrium
contribution function is unchanged. Both groups submit contributions according to the original
function C deﬁned in Eq. 3. Total expected contributions equal v
3, and expected politician revenue
is (1    )v
3. C is strictly increasing for all     [0,1]. Therefore, unlike in the case of a contribu-
tion limit, in equilibrium the politician can always correctly infer an interest group’s   from its
contribution. The politician remains fully-informed about interest group evidence. He is able to
implement ˆ p, which results in the maximum policy utility. His expected utility from selling access
is E(UP| ,a = 1) =
 
12 + (1    )v
3.
5.3 Selling Policy v. Selling Access with Tax
When contributions are taxed at rate  , the politician prefers to sell access if
 




2 + (1    )v. Rearranging this expression gives the condition     (1    )8
7v. Therefore, for any
    [0,1], ¯  ( ) = (1    )8
7v, and
 ¯  
   < 0. The cuto  value ¯   is strictly decreasing in the tax rate,
where ¯  (1) = 0.
Lemma 3 For any     (0,1]:
201. ¯  ( ) < v
2. The tax results in the politician selling access for a larger range of issues, and
selling policy for a smaller range of issues.
2. The politician remains fully informed about  R and  L when he sells access.
5.4 E ect of Tax on Constituent Welfare
For any  , if the politician sells access then he becomes fully informed about interest group evidence
in equilibrium, and he is able to identify and implement his fully-informed policy ˆ p. Therefore,
selling access results in the maximum possible constituent welfare. Furthermore, given any issue  ,
it is possible to set   such that the politician chooses to sell access.
Lemma 4 For each  , there exists a      [0,1) such that for any        the politician sells access
and p =ˆ p.
Before the realization of  , it is optimal from the standpoint of the constituents to set   = 1.
When   = 1, the politician, who cares about identifying his fully-informed policy, chooses to sell
access to the group who submits the highest (fully-taxed) contribution. He does this for all  , and
he remains fully informed in the process.
Proposition 3 A tax    =1achieves the maximum possible constituent welfare with probability
1.
A tax rate of 1 results in the politician selling access for all possible issues. He therefore becomes
fully informed independent of   and implements p =ˆ p with probability 1. This represents the ﬁrst-
best optimal outcome for constituents, which is not achieved in the unregulated game or under a
limit.
The model assumes that politician revenue does not directly beneﬁt constituents. Contributions
may, however, provide some social beneﬁt if they are used to run advertisements during campaigns.
Coate (2004b), for example, develops a model in which contributions fund ads that help inform vot-
ers about politician quality. If contributions are used for such purposes, fully taxing contributions
may not be optimal. Although it is feasible that a high tax combined with some system to public
campaign ﬁnancing may be optimal for constituent welfare. This issue is not further addressed in
the present paper.
216 Tax Versus Limit
Both a tax and a limit can cause the politician to switch from selling policy favors to selling access,
which results in better policy choices and improves constituent welfare. However, a limit decreases
the politician’s available information in the access game. This is not the case with a tax; the
politician remains fully-informed when he sells access.
The optimal tax rate    = 1 results in expected constituent welfare of EW(  ) = 0, which
is strictly greater than the expected constituent welfare under any possible limit. If constituents
receive additional beneﬁts from the collected taxes, then the advantage of taxing, rather than
limiting contributions is further increased. The tax rate need not be at    in order for taxing
contributions to result in higher expected constituent welfare than a contribution limit.
Proposition 4 There exists a tax rate ˆ  < 1 such that for all     ˆ  ,
• EW( ) > EW(¯ c ), and
• EW( ) > EW( ).
A tax is clearly better than a limit when it comes to achieving the best policy and highest
constituent welfare. A tax rate of   = 1 achieves the maximum possible expected constituent
welfare in the policy favor and access game.25
This does not however imply that the politician prefers a tax. First note that the politician
prefers no regulation to a contribution tax, as a tax simply limits the revenue associated with any
action. Suppose, however, there is outside pressure for campaign ﬁnance reform. To model this,
assume that the politician can select either a limit or a tax to achieve some minimum required cuto 
value ¯   . Does the politician prefer to achieve ¯    through the use of a limit or a tax? Remember
that ¯   = 8
7v without either a limit or a tax; therefore, only ¯    < 8
7v are of interest.
Proposition 5 To achieve any ¯    < 8
7v, the politician prefers the use of a limit rather than a tax
so long as v is su ciently large.
25Such a tax is distinctly di erent from a contribution ban, even through both regulations result in the politician
collecting no revenue. Under a high tax, the interest groups still make payments that are observed by the politician
and used to determine which group receives access. This is equivalent to “burning money.” A ban could potentially
also lead to such an outcome if interest groups donate money to the politician’s favorite charity or community
organization in place of providing a campaign contribution. The politician will remain fully informed in such a
situation, so long as he observes the charitable donations of all groups and grants access to the group that provides
the largest donation.
22Proposition 5 shows that the politician may support the use of a limit rather than a tax, even
when a tax results in higher constituent welfare. This will be true whenever interest groups are
su ciently wealthy. Consider an extreme case where ¯    = 0. The politician can achieve ¯    through
a tax rate of   = 1, which maximizes policy utility but results in the politician collecting no
contribution revenue. Alternatively, the politician can achieve the required cuto  by setting a limit
¯ c = v
8, which results in the politician collecting 2¯ c in revenue, but being fully uninformed about
one of the interest group’s   in equilibrium.26 In this case, total expected politician policy utility
equals
 
24. The politician prefers to achieve ¯    through a limit ¯ c = v






24 or equivalently v>
 
6. Such a v cuto  exists for any ¯    < 8
7v. This result
may help explain why contribution limits are popular policy instruments, but contribution taxes
are uncommon.
7 Interest Group Asymmetries
There are various ways to incorporate interest group asymmetries into the model. I do so by allowing
interest groups to di er in terms of their valuation parameter v. Without loss of generality, assume
that group R is more wealthy than group L; therefore, vR >v L. This may also be interpreted as
group R caring more about the issue than group L. Both interpretations are reasonable, and justify
consideration of this extention.
In the policy favor game, the model takes the form of the all-pay auction analyzed by Gavious et
al. (2002). Because the interest groups di er in terms of their valuations, they no longer follow the
same mixed strategies. Instead, group R is more likely to submit a higher contribution compared to
group L, and is more likely to win the policy favor. Group R wins with probability 1  vL
2vR > 1
2. Total
expected contributions collected by the politician equal
vL(vR+vL)
2vR <v L, and expected politician





In the access game, I assume that the politician gives access to the interest group that signals
the highest quality evidence, rather than the group that provides the largest contribution.27 In this
26When ¯ c =
v
8, both groups contribute ¯ c independent of their  , and the politician randomly awards access to one
of the groups.
27Such an assumption simpliﬁes the analysis, and is reasonable given the accounts of politicians and interest groups
(see for example, Schram (1995), Makinson (2003)). Smaller, local organization often need to contribute less to achieve
access than larger, more wealthy organization. Without this assumption, there is pooling amongst the highest   rich
groups. However, the politician will remain fully informed, as a rich group with such high   will win access, as the
23case, interest group contribution functions are unchanged from the earlier analysis, expect they
now depend on a group’s v as well as its  . Therefore, Cj( )=
 
1    
2
   vj
2 . Because a group’s
contribution function is strictly increasing in its  , the politician continues to be able to correctly
infer a group’s   from its contribution. He remains fully informed and implements ˆ p. Allowing
interest groups to di er in terms of v therefore does not change the policy outcome of the access
game. It does, however, change the expected total contributions. Now, expected politician revenue
equals vR+vL
6 .
The politician sells access whenever
 
12 + vR+vL




2vR . Rearranging gives







(3vL   vR).
When interest groups have the same v, selling policy favors always results in higher expected
revenue than selling access. However, when groups di er in terms of v, this is not necessarily the
case. When vL < vR
3 , selling access results in higher expected contributions, and higher policy
utility; for this range of values the politician prefers to sell access for all realizations of  . For
larger vL, the politician prefers to sell access only for important enough issues–those issues with
high enough  .
Just as in the game without interest group asymmetries, introducing either a contribution limit
and a tax can cause the politician to switch from selling policy to selling access. Selling access
is always better for constituents than selling policy favors. While a limit may have averse a ects
on politician information when he does sell access, however, a tax does not have such a ects.
Therefore, introducing a tax can assure that the politician sells policy, and that he continues to be
able to identify and implement his fully informed policy.
8 Discussion
This paper combines a stylized model of policy favors with a stylized model of access to help gain
a better understanding of the role of political contributions and the e ects of campaign ﬁnance
reforms. The mechanisms through which this paper assumes the politician awards favors or access
are not the only means by which a politician may trade policy choices or access for contributions.
pooling contribution amount is greater than the contribution from any type of poor group.
24Allowing the politician to award policy or access through alternative means should not change the
main results, so long as the politician continues to choose “better” policy in the money-for-access
subgame than in the money-for-policy subgame.
In this paper, the politician gives access to the interest group that provides the highest con-
tribution (or in the case of interest group asymmetries, to the group that signals the highest  ).
Alternatively, the politician may set a price for access, and any group that pays the set price re-
ceives access (e.g., Austen-Smith 1998). Cotton (2008) considers such a mechanism while assuming
an underlying evidentiary structure similar to the one developed in this paper. Under such an al-
ternative mechanism for awarding access, the politician becomes fully informed about the evidence
of any group with access, and he becomes partially informed about the evidence of any group that
does not pay for access. This is because only groups with high-enough   are willing to pay the set
access fee, and the politician can correctly infer that any group who does not pay the fee has a lower
 . Selling access through access fees still results in a more informed policy decision than selling
policy favors. Therefore, the main results of the paper should continue to hold: the representative
constituent tends to be better o  when the politician sells access rather than favors, both a limit
and a tax can make selling access more likely, and a tax does so without further distorting the
politician’s information.
There are also alternative means through which the politician may sell policy. For example,
the politician may sell policy through a menu auction in which each interest group provides a
contribution schedule that assigns a payment to each possible policy choice (e.g., Grossman and
Helpman 1994, Bernheim and Whinston 1986). Such a mechanism may result in a moderate
equilibrium policy choice (e.g., p = 0); however the policy choice is still made by a less informed
politician and does not result in as good of policy as in the access subgame in which the politician
is more-fully informed. Again, the main results of the paper should continue to hold.
Another means of generalizing the model is to allow for noisy information in the access game.
For example, interest groups may not know exactly how the politician will interpret their evidence.
One way to model this is for each interest group to observe a signal correlated with its  j. In this
case, the contribution function is increasing in a group’s signal rather than the its  , which the
groups do not observe. If a group wins access, the politician still becomes fully informed about  j.
Otherwise, the politician remains less than fully-informed about the groups  j, although he can
25infer the group’s signal from its contribution. To the extent that a group’s signal is correlated with
its true type, contributions still enable the politician to become better informed about a group’s
type. Here, the politician continues to be better informed and choose better policy when he sells
access rather than favors.
The access framework in this paper also assumes that interest groups are endowed with evi-
dence about their respective issues, but politicians are ex ante uncertain about the evidence. This
assumption is supported by the idea that interest groups are actively involved with their issues,
but politicians must make decisions regarding many issues, some of which they likely know little or
nothing about. It would also be reasonable, however, to assume that the acquisition or presentation
of evidence is costly for the interest groups. So long as the costs to an interest group are low enough,
such an assumption should weaken, but not signiﬁcantly change the results. For example, if the
presentation of evidence is costly, only groups with high-enough evidence quality pay to present it
if they gain access. This would likely create pooling amongst the groups with low quality evidence,
who will not ﬁnd it worthwhile to pay the presentation costs. If the costs are small enough, most
groups will continue to behave according to the original model. The same should be true if the
politician can pay to conduct his own research, so long as his costs are su ciently large compared
to the research costs of the interest groups.
9 Conclusion
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, it develops a new model of lobbying and money
in politics. The framework combines a traditional money-for-policy model with an informational
lobbying and money-for-access game. The model shows that for some issues, the politician provides
policy favors in exchange for contributions. For other issues (those of great enough importance),
the politician provides access in exchange for contributions, where information revealed through
access allows him to make better policy decisions.
Second, the paper compares two types of campaign ﬁnance reform: imposing contribution limits,
and taxing contributions. The analysis shows that both a contribution limit and a tax may result
in better policy outcomes. This is because either reform may cause the politician to sell more
access and fewer policy favors. When the analysis compares the e ects of a contribution limit and
26a contribution tax, however, a tax is clearly the better type of campaign ﬁnance reform for the
representative constituent. A limit makes selling access more likely, but at the same time reduces
the politician’s ability to identify and implement his fully-informed policy. A tax, on the other
hand, makes selling access more likely without reducing politician information.
The framework developed here likely applies to some issues better than others. Certain interest
groups likely give to candidates because they want to help the candidate win election, not because
they want to secure access or buy policy favors. In this way, this paper’s model probably does not
apply to an issue like abortion, for which politicians are already well informed or likely to publicly
commit to a position, and for which constituents likely have strong beliefs. Instead, such a model
is likely a better ﬁt for an issue such as steel tari s in which the domestic automobile producers
have arguments against a tari , the domestic steel industry has arguments in favor of a tari , and
most politicians are not well informed about the optimal level of tari  for their constituents.
There are some obvious shortcoming of the model. Although not considered in this paper,
interactions between a politician and interest groups are often repeated over time, policy is often
chosen by a group of legislators rather than a single decision maker, and politicians use contributions
to compete against other politicians for election. Future work may address these issues.
10 Appendix
10.1 Equilibrium Contribution Function with Limit
The contribution limit constrains the possible contributions, but does not directly inﬂuence the
interest groups’ willingness to contribute. Interest groups with high enough evidence quality prefer
to contribute more than the limit, but are unable to do so. Groups with low enough evidence
quality are happy contributing less than the limit. Let ¯  (¯ c) denote the   cuto  associated with
limit ¯ c such that groups with  > ¯   contribute the limit, and those with     ¯   contribute less than
the limit. If both groups contribute ¯ c, each wins access with equal probability. If a group receives
access, the politician observes its evidence directly. If a group contributes ¯ c and does not receive
access, the politician acts as if the politician has   equal to Eµ( )= ¯  +1
2 .
A group with     ¯   has the same incentives to contribute as without a limit; therefore,
C¯ c( )=C( ) for     ¯  . If group j contributes c<¯ c, then it receives expected payo  equal to
27Eq. 1. For   in this range, a group’s expected payo  is maximized when it contributes according
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d  j   ¯ c. (9)
If the other group contributes less than the limit (which it does when  L < ¯  ), group j receives
access and the politician also correctly learns group  j’s evidence through its contribution. If  j
also contributes the limit, each group receives access with equal probability, and the politician only
learns the evidence quality of the group that receives access.
For any  < ¯  (¯ c), the beneﬁt of contributing the limit (i.e., Eq. 9 minus Eq. 8) is strictly
increasing in the group’s  . The higher  j, the more attractive j ﬁnds contributing the limit,
rather than any value less than the limit. The cuto  value ¯  (¯ c) is the evidence value at which the
interest group is indi erent between contributing ¯ c and contributing C(¯  ) (i.e., ¯   solves for  j the
equality Eq. 9 = Eq. 8). Solving for ¯   gives ¯   =1 
 
2   8¯ c
v . When ¯     0, the interest group
contributes the limit for all  . This happens whenever ¯ c   v
8.
10.2 Proofs
Formal proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3 are omitted. They follow directly from the
analysis in the body of the paper and in appendix section 10.1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider ﬁrst the maximum equilibrium contribution revenue. The worse-
possible policy utility for an interest group equals  v
2, which happens when the politician imple-
ments the other group’s policy. For any p, group R receives policy payo  pv
2 and group L receives
policy payo   pv
2. Suppose interest group i contributes according to an equilibrium strategy si, and
that F(·|sL,s R) is the equilibrium distribution of policy choice p given the equilibrium strategies.
The expected policy beneﬁt to interest group R of participating is
  1
 1 f(p|sL,s R)
 
pv




Independent of how policy is chosen (i.e., through the sale of access, the sale of policy favors, or in
28some other way), an interest group’s equilibrium contribution will not exceed the expected beneﬁt
from making the contribution. Therefore, EcR(sR,s L)  
  1
 1 f(p|sL,s R)
 
pv




larly for EcL. Together, this means EcR +EcL  
  1
 1 f(p|sL,s R)
 
v + pv
2   pv
2
 
dp = v. Therefore,
total expected revenue cannot exceed v. Selling policy favors achieves v; while selling access results
in total expected contributions of v
3 <v .
Next, consider the maximum equilibrium politician policy utility. By deﬁnition ˆ p   argmaxp W(p).
In the access subgame, p =ˆ p with probability 1; thus maximizing policy utility and constituent
welfare. In the policy favor subgame, p  =ˆ p with probability 1, thus achieving lower expected policy
utility.
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where ¯  (¯ c) is deﬁned by Eq. 7. First, it should be clear from EW(¯ c) above that a limit of ¯ c = v
4
is strictly better (for constituent welfare) than any higher limit, or no limit at all. This follows
because
 ¯  
 ¯ c   0 for all ¯ c   v
4 and
 ¯  





. Remember g( ) > 0 for all  > 0.





. For this range of limit,
 EW(¯ c)
 ¯ c = g(¯  (¯ c))
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g(2v/7)¯   (v/4).
The derivative of the cuto  value with respect to the limit,
 ¯  (¯ c)






 ¯ c < 0. Given an initial ¯ c = v
4, marginally decreasing ¯ c strictly increases expected
constituent welfare. Thus, ¯ c  < v
4.








   
0
g( ) d  > 0.
Given an initial ¯ c = v
8, marginally increasing ¯ c strictly increases expected constituent welfare. Thus,
¯ c  > v
8. Taken together these conditions imply v
8 < ¯ c  < v
4.
Proof of Lemma 4. Deﬁne      max
 





. Given some tax rate  , the politician sells
access if     ¯  ( ) = (1    )8
7v. Rearranging, the politician sells access if     1   7
8
 
v. Since     0,
it follows that the politician sells access i        . From the analysis in the body of the paper, it
follows that whenever the politician sells access in the game with a contribution tax, the politician
becomes fully informed in equilibrium. A fully-informed politician chooses his fully-informed policy,
setting p =ˆ p.
Proof of Proposition 3. For any tax rate     [0,1], ex ante expected constituent welfare is
EW( )=










   
(1  ) 8
7v
g( )




which is strictly increasing in     [0,1]. Therefore, EW( ) is maximized at the maximum tax rate,
  = 1. Therefore, EW(  = 1) =
   
0 g( )




Proof of Proposition 4. From the proof to Proposition 3, it is clear that EW( ) is strictly
increasing in  , and ranges from
   
0 g( )
   
12
 










   
8
7v g( )




when   = 0.
From the proof to Proposition 2, it is clear that for any ¯ c   0, EW(¯ c) <
   
0 g( )




Therefore, EW(¯ c) < EW(  = 1). Let EW(¯ c ) denote the maximum possible ex ante expected
welfare under a limit. Let    solve EW( )=EW(¯ c ) for  , where EW  is given by Eq. 10. Given
that EW( ) is strictly increasing in   and that EW(¯ c) < EW(  = 1) for all ¯ c, it follows that    < 1.
Given that EW( ) is strictly increasing in  , it follows that for any   >   , EW( ) > EW(¯ c).





. The required limit to
achieve ¯   =¯    solves 2¯ c 
¯   
2 =
¯   
12 + v
3; therefore, ¯ c = 1
24 (4v + 7¯   ). The politician’s expected utility
30in the game with such a limit equals
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To achieve ¯    through a tax, the required   solves
¯   
12 + (1    )2
3v =  
¯   
2 + (1    )v; therefore,
  =
8v 7¯   
8v . This is true for any ¯    < 8
7v. The politician’s expected utility in the game with such a
tax equals
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0 g( )(8v   7¯   ) 1
24d  > 0, which holds for all v, given that ¯    < 8
7v.





. For values in this range, the required limit to achieve
¯    solves Eq. 7 as an equality. The required tax is the same as in the ﬁrst case. To prove that there
exists a v large enough such that the politician prefers regulation through a limit, it is su cient
to show that there exists a v large enough such that the politician prefers the limit to the tax for
each possible realization of  , with strict preference for some potential realizations.
For  < ¯   , the politician sells favors and the politician’s realized utility is independent of
the type of regulation. Here the politician is indi erent between both types of regulation. For
   
 
¯   , 2
7v
 
, the politician earns expected payo 
 
12  (1  ¯  (¯ c))4  
24 +2(1  ¯  (¯ c))¯ c+v
 
¯  (¯ c)2
2 +
¯  (¯ c)3
6
 
under required limit ¯ c, and the politician earns expected payo 
 
12 +
7¯   
24 under the required tax. For
this range of  , the expected payo  under the tax is independent of v, while the expected payo 
under the limit is strictly approaches   as v    . Thus, the politician will strictly prefer the limit





, the politician earns expected payo 
 
12+v
3 under a limit. Under
the required tax, the politician earns the same expected payo  as in the case when    
 




politician’s expected payo  is strictly increasing in v under the limit, with EUP   as v    ,
and the politician’s expected payo  is again independent of v under the tax, given  . Again, the
politician will strictly prefer the limit for large enough v. Finally, for     8
7v, the politician earns
the same expected payo 
 
12 + v
3 under either regulation and is therefore indi erence.
31For large enough v, the politician strictly prefers the limit for some potential realizations of  ,
and is indi erent between the tax and the limit for all other realizations of  . Therefore, if v is
large enough, the politician earns a strictly higher ex ante expected utility under the limit, and
thus strictly prefers the limit to the tax.
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